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Foreword
A dynamical model for an evolutionary nonantagonistic (nonzero sum) game between
two populations is considered. A scheme of a dynamical Nash equilibrium in the class
of feedback (discontinuous) controls is proposed. The construction is based on solutions
of auxiliary antagonistic (zero-sum) diﬀerential games. A method for approximating the
corresponding value functions is developed. The method uses approximation schemes for
constructing generalized (minimax, viscosity) solutions of ﬁrst order partial diﬀerential
equations of Hamilton-Jacobi type. A numerical realization of a grid procedure is de-
scribed. Questions of convergence of approximate solutions to the generalized one (the
value function) are discussed, and estimates of convergence are pointed out. The method
provides equilibrium feedbacks in parallel with the value functions. Implementation of
grid approximations for feedback control is justiﬁed. Coordination of long- and short-term
interests of populations and individuals is indicated. A possible relation of the proposed
game model to the classical replicator dynamics is outlined.
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A Differential Model for a
2× 2-Evolutionary Game Dynamics
A. M. Tarasyev∗
Introduction
We consider a nonantagonistic dynamical game of two large groups (populations) of indi-
viduals. The dynamical system describing population evolution is motivated by diﬀeren-
tial (see [Isaacs, 1965]) and evolutionary game-theoretical models (see [Friedman, 1991],
[Young, 1993]) relevant to problems of economic change (see [Nelson and Winter, 1982])
and population dynamics (see [Hofbauer, Sigmund, 1988]). For a particular class of 2× 2
deterministic evolutionary game dynamics, an approach to analyse populations’ behaviors
via methods of the theory of diﬀerential games was proposed in [Kryazhimskii, 1994]. In
the present paper we develop some aspects of this approach for a stochastic 2× 2 evolu-
tionary game dynamics. Namely, we focus on ﬁnding equilibrium populations’ behaviors
within the totally centralized regulation pattern. The model is reduced to a closed-loop
diﬀerential game ([Krasovskii, Subbotin, 1988], [Krasovskii, 1985], [Kleimenov, 1993])
and analysed via methods of the theory of generalized (minimax, viscosity) solutions of
Hamilton-Jacobi equations ([Crandall, Lions, 1983, 1984], [Subbotin, 1980, 1991]).
It is supposed that at each time instant, individuals of each population are divided
into two parts playing diﬀerent strategies. Individuals from diﬀerent populations meet
pairwise randomly and get their current payoﬀs determined by a combination of their
strategies. Populations’ goals are to maximize “long-term” payoﬀs represented as intergals
of mathematical expectations for current payoﬀs, with an appropriate discount.
The right-hand side of the considered dynamical system depends on control parameters
making individuals change their current strategies in accordance with a chosen feedback.
The nonantagonistic game in question consists in constructing Nash equilibrium feed-
backs with respect to the “long-term” dynamical payoﬀ functionals.
We consider the problem within the framework of the theory of positional diﬀerential
games ([Krasovskii, Subbotin, 1988]). Following to [Kleimenov, 1993] we compose a Nash
equilibrium with the help of solutions of auxiliary antagonistic (zero-sum) diﬀerential
games. Solutions of these antagonistic games are based on algorithms of building the value
functions. It is known ([Crandall, Lions, 1983, 1984], [Subbotin, 1980, 1991]) that the
value function is the generalized solution of the Bellman-Isaacs equation being a ﬁrst-order
partial diﬀerential equation of Hamilton-Jacobi type. To construct value functions we
use appropriate approximation schemes ([Dolcetta, 1983], [Souganidis, 1985], [Tarasyev,
1993], [Adiatulina, Tarasyev, 1987], [Bardi, Osher], [Subbotin, Tarasyev, Ushakov]). The
corresponding numerical procedure is reduced to the method of contraction operators.
Along with information of the value functions, the method provides equilibrium feedbacks.
Stress once again that a solution is obtained within the centralized scheme implying
that long-term-equilibrium behaviors can, generally, contradict to short-term interests
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of individuals. We conclude the paper with a discussion of possible problem settings
combining long- and short-term principles for constructing dynamical Nash equilibria. In
particular, we consider the possibility of linking the proposed dynamical Nash equilibrium
approach with the classical replicator dynamics (see [Hofbauer, Sigmund, 1988]).
1 The Model of Game Dynamics
1.1 Dynamics, Payoffs, Player’s Preferences
We consider the following dynamical system which describes game interaction of two
populations of individuals. We can assume, for example, that one of this population is
an aggregate of sellers and another is an aggregate of buyers. For clearness of arguments
suppose that individuals of populations can choose at each moment of time one of two
simple actions (strategies): buyers can ”buy” or ”not buy”, sellers can sell at ”high price”
or ”low price”. Actions of individuals of the ﬁrst population are denoted by index i:
index i = 1 corresponds to action ”buy”, index i = 2 corresponds to action ”not buy”.
Analogously, actions of individuals of the second population are denoted by index j: index
j = 1 corresponds to ”high price”, index j = 2 corresponds to ”low price”.
Let us consider an arbitrary pair composed by individuals of diﬀerent populations.
This pair is interpreted as a situation (i, j) in the current game generated by strategy i of
a player from the ﬁrst population and by strategy j of a player from the second population.
Assume that payoﬀ of players of the ﬁrst population is determined by coeﬃcients aij of
the payoﬀ matrix A = {aij}. Analogously, payoﬀ of players of the second population in
situation (i, j) is determined by coeﬃcients bij of the payoﬀ matrix B = {bij}.
Let us assume that the ﬁrst population consists of N individuals and at the instant
of time t one part of them N1(t) plays the ﬁrst strategy and another part N2(t) plays
the second strategy. Of course, N = N1(t) + N2(t). Similarly, assume that the second
population consists of M individuals and at the moment t one part M1(t) plays the ﬁrst
strategy and another part M2(t) plays the second strategy, M =M1(t) +M2(t).
Let us suppose that dynamics of the process in which individuals change their strate-
gies from one to another is described by the multistep system of equations
N1(t+ δ) = N1(t)− n12(t)δ + n21(t)δ
N2(t+ δ) = N2(t) + n12(t)δ − n21(t)δ
M1(t+ δ) = M1(t)−m12(t)δ +m21(t)δ
M2(t+ δ) = M2(t) +m12(t)δ −m21(t)δ (1.1)
The peculiarity of such dynamics consists in the fact that the number of individuals in
populations which can change their strategies at the moment t is proportional to the time
step δ. More precisely,
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n12(t)δ is the number of individuals of the ﬁrst population
which change their strategies from the ﬁrst to the
second, 0 ≤ n12(t) ≤ N1(t);
n21(t)δ is the number of individuals of the ﬁrst population
which change their strategies from the second to the
ﬁrst, 0 ≤ n21(t) ≤ N2(t);
m12(t)δ is the number of individuals of the second population
which change their strategies from the ﬁrst to the
second, 0 ≤ m12(t) ≤M1(t);
m21(t)δ is the number of individuals of the second population
which change their strategies from the second to the
ﬁrst, 0 ≤ m21(t) ≤M2(t).
The fact that at the moment t only a part of individuals in population proportional
to the time step δ can change their strategies has the following interpretations. For
example, such inertia of behaviour of population can be explained if we assume that only
”small” part of individuals is active in changing of their behaviour. We can give another
explanation if assume that there are some restrictions (”queues”) in case when ”large”
group of individuals change actions.
On the other hand we make rather natural assumption when suppose that the number
nik(t) or mjl(t) of individuals which potentially may wish to change their actions (but not
obligatory change, because the number of those who change is equal to nik(t)δ or mjl(t)δ)
satisﬁes the restrictions
0 ≤ nik ≤ Ni(t), i, k = 1, 2, i = k
0 ≤ mjl ≤Mj(t), j, l = 1, 2, j = l
Let us suppose that at the moment t players of diﬀerent populations compose pairs
randomly with equal probabilities. The probability of the fact that the randomly chosen
pair plays the situation (i, j) is determined by the formula
pij(t) =
Ni(t)Mj(t)
NM
(1.2)
It is easy to verify standard relations for probabilities pij(t)
pij(t) ≥ 0,
∑
i,j
pij(t) = 1, i, j = 1, 2 (1.3)
Let us pass from the multistep dynamical system (1.1) which connects quantities
Ni(t + δ) and Mj(t + δ) with quantities Ni(t) and Mj(t) to the system which connects
probabilities pij(t+ δ) and pij(t).
Let us compose, for example, the corresponding dynamical equation for the probability
p11(t+ δ). We have
p11(t+ δ) =
N1(t+ δ)M1(t+ δ)
NM
=
(N1(t)− n12(t)δ + n21(t)δ)(M1(t)−m12(t)δ +m21(t)δ)
NM
=
N1(t)M1(t)
NM
−
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N1(t)M1(t)
NM
m12(t)
M1(t)
δ +
N1(t)M2(t)
NM
m21(t)
M2(t)
δ −
N1(t)M1(t)
NM
n12(t)
N1(t)
δ +
N2(t)M1(t)
NM
n21(t)
N2(t)
δ +
(−n12(t) + n21(t))(−m12(t) +m21(t))
NM
δ2
Taking into account notations for probabilities pij(t) we obtain the equation
p11(t+ δ)− p11(t) = −p11(t)v1δ + p12(t)v2δ − p11(t)u1δ + p21(t)u2δ + φ(t)δ2 (1.4)
Here
u1 = u1(t) =
n12(t)
N1(t)
u2 = u2(t) =
n21(t)
N2(t)
v1 = v1(t) =
m12(t)
M1(t)
v2 = v2(t) =
m21(t)
M2(t)
(1.5)
0 ≤ ui ≤ 1, i = 1, 2
0 ≤ vj ≤ 1, j = 1, 2 (1.6)
|φ(t)| ≤ 1
Dividing equation (1.4) into δ > 0 and passing to limit when δ ↓ 0 we come to the
diﬀerential equation
p˙11(t) = −p11(t)u1(t) + p21(t)u2(t)− p11(t)v1(t) + p12(t)v2(t)
Analogously one can deduce diﬀerential equations for p˙12(t), p˙21(t), p˙22(t).
Let us write diﬀerential equations which describe the motion of the considered dy-
namical system using standard notations
x1 = p11, x2 = p12, x3 = p21, x4 = p22 (1.7)
We obtain the following bilinear system of diﬀerential equations with respect to prob-
abilities x1, x2, x3, x4
x˙1 = −x1u1 + x3u2 − x1v1 + x2v2 = f1(x, u, v)
x˙2 = −x2u1 + x4u2 + x1v1 − x2v2 = f2(x, u, v)
x˙3 = x1u1 − x3u2 − x3v1 + x4v2 = f3(x, u, v)
x˙4 = x2u1 − x4u2 + x3v1 − x4v2 = f4(x, u, v)
(1.8)
Here
x = (x1, x2, x3, x4), u = (u1, u2), v = (v1, v2)
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1.2 Properties of Dynamical System
Let us turn our attention to some properties of control dynamical system (1.8). This
dynamics conserves the following properties of probabilities.
Lemma 1.1 If
x1(0) + x2(0) + x3(0) + x4(0) = 1 (1.9)
then
x1(t) + x2(t) + x3(t) + x4(t) = 1 ∀t (1.10)
Proof. Actually
f1(x, u, v) + f2(x, u, v) + f3(x, u, v) + f4(x, u, v) = 0
and, hence,
x˙1(t) + x˙2(t) + x˙3(t) + x˙4(t) = 0 ∀t
We obtain
x1(t) + x2(t) + x3(t) + x4(t) = c ∀t
From (1.9) we have c = 1.
Lemma 1.2 If
x1(0)x4(0) − x2(0)x3(0) = 0 (1.11)
then
x1(t)x4(t)− x2(t)x3(t) = 0 ∀t (1.12)
Proof. Let us note that (1.11) takes place for our model because
x1(0)x4(0)− x2(0)x3(0) = N1M1N2M2
NM
− N1M2N2M1
NM
= 0
Let
z(t) = x1(t)x4(t)− x2(t)x3(t), z(0) = 0
We have
z˙ = x˙1x4 + x1x˙4 − x˙2x3 − x2x˙3 =
(−x1x4 + x2x3)(u1 + u2 + v1 + v2) =
−z(u1 + u2 + v1 + v2)
Hence
z(t) = z(0) exp(−
∫ t
0
(u1(s) + u2(s) + v1(s) + v2(s))ds)
Since z(0) = 0 then z(t) ≡ 0.
Thus the relations
x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 = 1 (1.13)
x1x4 − x2x3 = 0 (1.14)
are ﬁrst integrals for dynamical system (1.8).
One can prove also that system (1.8) conserves the following properties of probabilities.
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Lemma 1.3 If
0 ≤ xi(0) ≤ 1 (1.15)
then
0 ≤ xi(t) ≤ 1 ∀t i = 1, 2, 3, 4 (1.16)
Proof. We prove this fact below for the reduced system.
1.3 Reduced Dynamical Systems
Let us note that since there are exist two ﬁrst integrals (1.13),(1.14) for dynamical system
(1.8) then its order can be reduced from the fourth to the second. We shall make this
reduction in convenient way for us. To this end we introduce the following variables
y1 = x1 + x2 is the probability of the fact that a player from
the ﬁrst population holds the ﬁrst strategy
y2 = x3 + x4 is the probability of the fact that a player from
the ﬁrst population holds the second strategy
y3 = x1 + x3 is the probability of the fact that a player from
the second population holds the ﬁrst strategy
y4 = x2 + x4 is the probability of the fact that a player from
the second population holds the second strategy
It is obvious that
y1 + y2 = 1, y3 + y4 = 1 (1.17)
Using (1.13),(1.14) one can prove also that
y1y3 = x1, y1y4 = x2, y2y3 = x3, y2y4 = x4 (1.18)
Actually, we have, for example,
y1y3 = (x1 + x2)(x1 + x3) = x1(x1 + x2 + x3) + x2x3 = x1(x1 + x2 + x3 + x4) = x1
From dynamical system (1.8) we obtain the following control system with respect to
probabilities y1, y2, y3, y4
y˙1 = −y1u1 + y2u2
y˙2 = y1u1 − y2u2
y˙3 = −y3v1 + y4v2
y˙4 = y3v1 − y4v2
(1.19)
Introducing notations y1 = x, y3 = y we obtain from (1.17) that y2 = 1 − x, y4 =
1− y. Substituting these relations to (1.19) we come to the following bilinear system of
diﬀerential equations with respect to probabilities x and y
x˙ = −xu1 + (1− x)u2
y˙ = −yv1 + (1− y)v2 (1.20)
Let us remind that controls u1, u2, v1, v2 are pure numbers here. They are determined
by relations (1.5) and satisﬁes restrictions (1.6). The extreme values of controls ui = 0 or
ui = 1, i = 1, 2 and vj = 0 or vj = 1, j = 1, 2 can be enterpreted as signals to individuals
of corresponding populations to change or not to change their actions. For example, the
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value u1 = 0 signals to individuals of the ﬁrst population to hold the ﬁrst strategy, not
to change actions, and the value u1 = 1 signals about necessity to alter the ﬁrst strategy
for the second.
In reality the system (1.20) can be replaced by the equivalent system of more simple
type. Let us consider, for example, the ﬁrst equation of the system (1.20) and transform
it in the following way
x˙ = −xu1 + (1− x)u2 = −x+ x(1− u1) + (1− x)u2
Let us introduce the new control parameter
u = x(1− u1) + (1− x)u2 (1.21)
We determine now the restrictions for the control parameter u. We have
u ∈ P (x), P (x) = P1(x) + P2(x)
P1(x) = {x(1− u1) : 0 ≤ u1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1} = [0, x]
P2(x) = {(1− x)u2 : 0 ≤ u2 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1} = [0, 1− x]
Hence, the set P (x) = [0, x] + [0, 1 − x] is the segment [0, 1] and it does not depend
on x. Thus, the ﬁrst equation of the system (1.20) can be replaced by the equation
x˙ = −x+ u, 0 ≤ u ≤ 1
Analogously, if we introduce the new control parameter
v = y(1− v1) + (1− y)v2 (1.22)
we obtain the diﬀerential equation with respect to the probability y
y˙ = −y + v, 0 ≤ v ≤ 1
Thus, we have the following system of diﬀerential equations with respect to probabil-
ities x and y
x˙ = −x+ u, 0 ≤ u ≤ 1
y˙ = −y + v, 0 ≤ v ≤ 1 (1.23)
Finally, let us verify that system (1.23) conserves properties of probabilities x and y.
Proof of Lemma 1.3.
Let u(s) : [0,+∞) → [0, 1] be a control function measurable in the sense of Lebesgue.
Then according to Cauchy formula we have
x(t) = (x0 +
∫ t
0
exp(s)u(s)ds) exp(−t)
If x(0) = x0 ≥ 0 then it is obvious that x(t) ≥ 0. Let x(0) = x0 ≤ 1. Then
x(t) ≤ (1 +
∫ t
0
exp(s)u(s)ds) exp(−t) ≤
exp(−t) +
∫ 0
−t
exp(s)u(s+ t)ds ≤
exp(−t) +
∫ 0
−t
exp(s)ds ≤ 1 (1.24)
Since system (1.23) conserves properties of probabilities then equivalent systems (1.8)
and (1.20) also conserve these properties.
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2 The Model of ”Short-Term” and ”Long-Term”
Payoffs
2.1 ”Short-Term” Payoffs
Let us pass now to the question about evaluation of payoﬀs of populations. It is naturally
to assume that the mathematical expectation connected with the corresponding payoﬀ
matrix is the payoﬀ of population at the moment of time t. Namely, quality of the
state x(t) = (x1(t), x2(t), x3(t), x4(t)) of dynamical process (1.8) is evaluated for the ﬁrst
population by the mathematical expectation
EA(t) = a11x1(t) + a12x2(t) + a21x3(t) + a22x4(t) (2.1)
and for the second population - by the mathematical expectation
EB(t) = b11x1(t) + b12x2(t) + b21x3(t) + b22x4(t) (2.2)
Taking into account the notations of the equivalent system (1.23) we can rewrite formulas
(2.1),(2.2) by means of probabilities x(t), y(t) in the following way
EA(t) = a11x(t)y(t) + a12x(t)(1− y(t)) +
a21(1− x(t))y(t) + a22(1− x(t))(1− y(t)) =
(a11 − a12 − a21 + a22)x(t)y(t)− (a22 − a12)x(t)−
(a22 − a21)y(t) + a22 (2.3)
EB(t) = b11x(t)y(t) + b12x(t)(1− y(t)) +
b21(1− x(t))y(t) + b22(1− x(t))(1− y(t)) =
(b11 − b12 − b21 + b22)x(t)y(t)− (b22 − b12)x(t)−
(b22 − b21)y(t) + b22 (2.4)
Let us note that in the theory of static bimatrix games (see, for example [Vorobjev, 1984])
there are special notations for the coeﬃcients of formulas (2.3),(2.4)
CA = a11 − a12 − a21 + a22
α1 = a22 − a12
α2 = a22 − a21
(2.5)
CB = b11 − b12 − b21 + b22
β1 = b22 − b12
β2 = b22 − b21
(2.6)
It is naturally to assume that formulas (2.3)-(2.4) describe the ”short-term” (calculated
at the ﬁxed moment of time t) payoﬀs of populations.
2.2 ”Long-Term” Payoffs
Let us consider now the dynamical system (1.23) on the inﬁnite interval of time [0,+∞).
Inﬁnity of the interval of time means that we are interested namely in the evolutionary
character of behaviour of trajectories generated by the dynamical system.
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Let (x(·), y(·)) = {(x(t), y(t)) : t ∈ [0,+∞)} be an arbitrary trajectory of the system
(1.23). We shall estimate the quality of this trajectory by the integral functionals with
discount coeﬃcients. For the ﬁrst population we determine the quality of a trajectory by
the functional
J1 = J1(x(·), y(·)) =∫ +∞
0
exp(−λt)EA(t)dt =
∫ +∞
0
exp(−λt)g1(x(t), y(t))dt =∫ +∞
0
exp(−λt)(CAx(t)y(t)− α1x(t)− α2y(t) + a22)dt (2.7)
and for the second population - by the functional
J2 = J2(x(·), y(·)) =∫ +∞
0
exp(−λt)EB(t)dt =
∫ +∞
0
exp(−λt)g2(x(t), y(t))dt =∫ +∞
0
exp(−λt)(CBx(t)y(t)− β1x(t)− β2y(t) + b22)dt (2.8)
Here λ > 0 is the so-called coeﬃcient of discount (which means discounting of the process
with growth of time). Functionals of such type are rather traditional for mathematical
models in economics (see, for example, references in [Dolcetta, 1983]). Let us note that
integrals (2.7), (2.8) always exist since 0 ≤ x(t) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ y(t) ≤ 1.
Functionals (2.7),(2.8) determine ”long-term” (on the inﬁnite interval of time) payoﬀs
of populations in contrast to ”short-term” payoﬀs (2.1)-(2.4).
Integrals (2.7),(2.8) can be interpreted also in terms of ”average” mathematical ex-
pectations. Indeed, let us, for example, consider integral (2.7). We normalize it by
multiplying on the discount coeﬃcient λ. We have
λ
∫ +∞
0
exp(−λt)(CAx(t)y(t)− α1x(t)− α2y(t) + a22)dt =
a11
∫ +∞
0
λ exp(−λt)x1(t)dt+ a12
∫ +∞
0
λ exp(−λt)x2(t)dt+
a21
∫ +∞
0
λ exp(−λt)x3(t)dt+ a22
∫ +∞
0
λ exp(−λt)x4(t)dt =
∑
i,j
aij
∫ +∞
0
λ exp(−λt)pij(t)dt =
a11p11 + a12p12 + a21p21 + a22p22 =
EA(x(·), y(·)) (2.9)
Here
pij =
∫ +∞
0
λ exp(−λt)pij(t)dt, i, j = 1, 2 (2.10)
It is easy to verify that 0 ≤ pij ≤ 1 and ∑i,j pij = 1. Hence, one can interpret numbers
pij as some special averaging (2.10) of probabilities pij(t), t ∈ [0,+∞) on the inﬁnite
interval of time. Therefore, it is naturally to regard number pij as ”average” probability
of the fact that random pairs of individuals play the situation (i, j) on the inﬁnite interval
of time. The functional (2.9) is interpreted then as ”average” mathematical expectation
EA(x(·), y(·)) of payoﬀ for the ﬁrst population on the inﬁnite interval of time.
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Analogously, the normalized functional (2.8) can be considered as ”average” mathe-
matical expectation EB(x(·), y(·)) of payoﬀ for the second population in inﬁnite horizon
λ
∫ +∞
0
exp(−λt)(CBx(t)y(t)− β1x(t)− β2y(t) + b22)dt =
b11
∫ +∞
0
λ exp(−λt)x1(t)dt+ b12
∫ +∞
0
λ exp(−λt)x2(t)dt+
b21
∫ +∞
0
λ exp(−λt)x3(t)dt+ b22
∫ +∞
0
λ exp(−λt)x4(t)dt =
∑
i,j
bij
∫ +∞
0
λ exp(−λt)pij(t)dt =
b11p11 + b12p12 + b21p21 + b22p22 =
EB(x(·), y(·)) (2.11)
3 Nash Equilibria in Dynamical System
3.1 Feedback Controls, Trajectories of Dynamical System
Let us assume that controls u and v for the ﬁrst and the second populations in sys-
tem (1.23) can be formed on the feedback principle. We suppose also that feedback
controls (strategies) U = u(t, x, y, ε) and V = v(t, x, y, ε) can be discontinuous func-
tions of phase variables (x, y). For deﬁnition of motions of the system generated by
discontinuous controls U = u(t, x, y, ε), V = v(t, x, y, ε) we shall use the approach
proposed in [Krasovskii, Subbotin, 1988]. Namely, let [0, T ] be an interval of time,
∆ = {t0 = 0 < t1 < t2 < ... < tN = T} be its partition with an instant time-step
δ = tk+1 − tk and ε > 0 be a parameter of accuracy 0 < δ < β(ε) where β(ε) ↓ 0 when
ε ↓ 0. Consider piecewise diﬀerentiable trajectory (x∆(·), y∆(·)) which is called ”Euler
spline” and is actually the step-by-step solution of the following diﬀerential equation
x˙∆(t) = −x∆(t) + u(tk, x∆(tk), y∆(tk), ε) (3.1)
y˙∆(t) = −y∆(t) + v(tk, x∆(tk), y∆(tk), ε)
t ∈ [tk, tk+1), k = 0, 1, ..., N − 1
x∆(0) = x0, y∆(0) = y0
The uniformly continuous limits of ”Euler splines” when N → ∞, ε ↓ 0, δ ↓ 0 are called
limit motions or simply motions of the system. The set of all these motions will be denoted
by the symbol XT (x0, y0, U, V ). This set is a compactum in the space of continuous
functions determined on [0, T ].
Definition 3.1 A continuous function (x(t), y(t)) : [0,+∞) → R2 is called trajectory of
the system (1.23) on the infinite interval of time generated by strategies U and V from
the initial position (x0, y0) if for any moment T, 0 < T < ∞ there exists a trajectory
(xT (t), yT (t)) ∈ XT (x0, y0, U, V ) which satisfies the condition (x(t), y(t)) = (xT (t), yT(t)),
t ∈ [0, T ]. The set of all these trajectories (x(t), y(t)) : [0,+∞) → R2 will be denoted by
the symbol X(x0, y0, U, V ).
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3.2 Nash Equilibria
Let us introduce deﬁniton of Nash equilibria for pairs of feedback controls (U = u(t, x, y, ε),
V = v(t, x, y, ε)).
Definition 3.2 A pair of feedback controls (U0, V 0) is called optimal (equilibrium) in the
sense of Nash for the fixed initial position (x0, y0) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] if for any other feedback
controls U and V the following condition holds. For all trajectories
(x0(·), y0(·)) ∈ X(x0, y0, U0, V 0), (x1(·), y1(·)) ∈ X(x0, y0, U, V 0)
(x2(·), y2(·)) ∈ X(x0, y0, U0, V )
inequalities
J1(x
0(·), y0(·)) ≥ J1(x1(·), y1(·))
J2(x
0(·), y0(·)) ≥ J2(x2(·), y2(·)) (3.2)
take place.
Remark 3.1 For construction of Nash equilibria we shall use the scheme proposed in
[Kleimenov, 1993]. We shall give the short description of this scheme below in Section 4.
We need to modify slightly Deﬁnition 3.2 because in reality we construct some ε-
approximations of optimal feedback controls. Therefore, let us introduce the notion of
ε-equilibria.
Definition 3.3 Let ε > 0 and (x0, y0) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1]. A pair of feedback controls (Uε, Vε)
is called ε-optimal (ε-equilibrium) in the sense of Nash for the fixed initial position (x0, y0)
if for any other feedback controls U and V the following condition holds. For all trajecto-
ries
(x0(·), y0(·)) ∈ X(x0, y0, Uε, Vε), (x1(·), y1(·)) ∈ X(x0, y0, U, Vε)
(x2(·), y2(·)) ∈ X(x0, y0, Uε, V )
inequalities
J1(x
0(·), y0(·)) ≥ J1(x1(·), y1(·))− ε
J2(x
0(·), y0(·)) ≥ J2(x2(·), y2(·))− ε (3.3)
take place.
Remark 3.2 Nash equilibria which will be constructed below possess indeed the more
strong properties than the properties indicated in Definitions 3.2, 3.3. These strong prop-
erties can be interpreted as dynamical stability of equilibria. Namely, we say that the Nash
equilibrium has the property of dynamical stability if it is not profitable for populations
to deviate from equilibrium feedback controls even along the whole equilibrium trajectory
(x0(·), y0(·)), i.e. the following enequalities hold for all t∗ > 0∫ +∞
t∗
exp(−λt)g1(x0(t), y0(t))dt ≥
∫ +∞
t∗
exp(−λt)g1(x1(t), y1(t))dt− ε∫ +∞
t∗
exp(−λt)g2(x0(t), y0(t))dt ≥
∫ +∞
t∗
exp(−λt)g2(x2(t), y2(t))dt− ε (3.4)
with ε = 0 for Definition 3.2 and with ε > 0 for Definition 3.3.
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3.3 Stability Properties of Dynamical System
Let us formulate the property of stability for dynamical system (1.23).
Lemma 3.1 Let u(t) : [0,+∞) → [0, 1], v(t) : [0,+∞) → [0, 1] be measurable controls
and (x1(·), y1(·)), (x2(·), y2(·)) be two trajectories of the system (1.23) generated by these
controls from different initial positions
(x1(0), y1(0)) = (x1, y1), (x2(0), y2(0)) = (x2, y2)
Then
|x1(t)− x2(t)| ≤ |x1 − x2| exp(−t)
|y1(t)− y2(t)| ≤ |y1 − y2| exp(−t) (3.5)
Moreover, there exists a constant C > 0 depending only on coefficients of matrixes A and
B such that the following estimates take place
|Jk(x1(·), y1(·))− Jk(x2(·), y2(·))| ≤
C
1 + λ
max{|x1 − x2|, |y1 − y2|}, k = 1, 2 (3.6)
Proof. Consider, for example, diﬀerential equations for x1(·) and x2(·)
x˙1(t) = −x1(t) + u(t), x1(0) = x1
x˙2(t) = −x2(t) + u(t), x2(0) = x2
Subtracting the second equation from the ﬁrst we obtain
∆x˙(t) = −∆x(t), ∆x(0) = x1 − x2
∆x(t) = x1(t)− x2(t)
Hence
∆x(t) = ∆x(0) exp(−t)
Analogously, we can obtain
∆y(t) = ∆y(0) exp(−t)
For the diﬀerence of functionals we have the estimate
|J1(x1(·), y1(·))− J1(x2(·), y2(·))| ≤∫ +∞
0
exp(−λt)|CA(x1(t)y1(t)− x2(t)y2(t))− α1(x1(t)− x2(t))− α2(y1(t)− y2(t))|dt ≤
C
∫ +∞
0
exp(−λt)max{|x1(t)− x2(t)|, |y1(t)− y2(t)|}dt ≤
Cmax{|x1 − x2|, |y1 − y2|}
∫ +∞
0
exp(−(1 + λ)t)dt =
C
1 + λ
max{|x1 − x2|, |y1 − y2|}
Finally we give the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1 For integral functionals with finite horizon T, 0 ≤ T < +∞ the estimate
similar to (3.6) takes place
|
∫ T
0
exp(−λt)gk(x1(t), y1(t))dt−
∫ T
0
exp(−λt)gk(x2(t), y2(t))dt| ≤
C
1 + λ
max{|x1 − x2|, |y1 − y2|} (3.7)
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4 Construction of Nash Equilibria
4.1 Auxiliary Antagonistic (Zero-Sum) Games
In order to construct equilibrium feedback controls we use the approach proposed in the
theory of diﬀerential games (see, for example, [Kleimenov, 1993]).
Let us consider auxiliary antagonistic (zero-sum) diﬀerential games Γ1 and Γ2 with
the functionals J1 (2.7) and J2 (2.8) respectively. In the game Γ1 the ﬁrst population
tries to maximize the functional J1(x(·), y(·)) using feedback controls U = u(t, x, y, ε).
The second population has the opposite aim, it tries to minimize this functional using
feedback controls V = v(t, x, y, ε). Conversely in the game Γ2 the ﬁrst population aims for
minimization of the functional J2(x(·), y(·)) and the second population wishes to maximize
it.
By the symbols w1(x, y) and w2(x, y) we denote value functions of auxiliary antag-
onistic games Γ1 and Γ2. It is known (see [Krasovskii, Subbotin, 1988], [Krasovskii,
1985]) that optimal feedback controls (control synthesis) Ui = u0i (t, x, y, ε), i = 1, 2 and
Vj = v0j (t, x, y, ε), j = 1, 2 of the ﬁrst and the second population in this antagonistic
game can be constructed on the information of value functions wk(·), k = 1, 2.
Strategies u01(t, x, y, ε) and v
0
2(t, x, y, ε) can be interpreted as strategies which have
positive nature (we shall call them ”positive” strategies) because they are aimed for
maximization of their own quality functional. Let us mention that these strategies are
cautious (guaranteed) feedback controls. Strategies u02(t, x, y, ε) and v
0
1(t, x, y, ε) can be
considered as strategies of ”punishment” because they minimize the payoﬀ functional of
another population.
4.2 Equilibrium Feedback Controls
Let us construct now the pair of feedback strategies which forms Nash equilibrium by past-
ing together ”positive” and ”punishment” strategies u0i (t, x, y, ε) and v
0
j (t, x, y, ε), i, j =
1, 2 of two populations.
Let (x0, y0) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1] be an arbitrary initial position, ε > 0 be an accuracy
parameter and (x(·), y(·)) ∈ X(x0, y0, u1(·), v2(·)) be a trajectory generated by ”positive”
strategies u01(t, x, y, ε) and v
0
2(t, x, y, ε). Let Tε > 0 be such a moment of time that∫ +∞
Tε
exp(−λt)|gi(x(t), y(t))|dt < ε
By the symbols uε(t) : [0, Tε) → [0, 1], vε(t) : [0, Tε) → [0, 1] we denote step-by-step
realizations of strategies u01(t, x, y, ε), v
0
2(t, x, y, ε) such that the corresponding step-by-
step motion (xε(·), yε(·)) satisﬁes the condition
max
t∈[0,Tε]
‖(x(t), y(t))− (xε(t), yε(t))‖ < ε
It is aﬃrmed that the following pair of feedback controls U0 = u0(t, x, y, ε), V 0 =
v0(t, x, y, ε) pasted with the help of ”positive” strategies u01(t, x, y, ε), v
0
2(t, x, y, ε) and
”punishment” strategies u02(t, x, y, ε), v
0
1(t, x, y, ε) forms an ε-equilibrium situation in the
sense of Nash
U0 = u0(t, x, y, ε) =
{
uε(t) if ‖(x, y)− (xε(t), yε(t))‖ < ε
u02(t, x, y, ε) otherwise
(4.1)
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V 0 = v0(t, x, y, ε) =
{
vε(t) if ‖(x, y)− (xε(t), yε(t))‖ < ε
v01(t, x, y, ε) otherwise
(4.2)
Let us remind that programming controls uε(t), vε(t) are realizations of ”positive”
strategies u01(t, x, y, ε), v
0
2(t, x, y, ε). In other words the “acceptable” trajectory (xε(·), yε(·))
is generated by “positive interests” of populations. The number ε can be interpreted as a
parameter of “reliance” of populations to each other or a level of “risk” which populations
allow in the game.
5 Value Functions of Differential Games
5.1 Value Functions for Games with Infinite Horizon
Let us consider now the auxiliary antagonistic (zero-sum) game Γ1 the dynamics of which
is described by equations
x˙ = −x+ u
y˙ = −y + v (5.1)
and the payoﬀ functional is determined by relation
J1(x(·), y(·)) =
∫ +∞
0
exp(−λt)g1(x(t), y(t))dt=∫ +∞
0
exp(−λt)(CAx(t)y(t)− α1x(t)− α2y(t) + a22)dt (5.2)
The aim of the ﬁrst population is to maximize the functional J1 (5.2) on trajectories
(x(·), y(·)) of the system (5.1) by disposing of control parameter U = u(t, x, y, ε). The aim
of the second population is opposite: to minimize the functional J1 (5.2) on trajectories
(x(·), y(·)) of the system (5.1) by disposing of control parameter V = v(t, x, y, ε).
According to formalization proposed in [Krasovskii, Subbotin, 1988] the antagonistic
game (5.1),(5.2) has the value function (x0, y0)→ w1(x0, y0)
w1(x0, y0) = sup
U
inf
(x(·),y(·))∈X(x0,y0,U)
J1(x(·), y(·)) =
inf
V
sup
(x(·),y(·))∈X(x0,y0,V )
J1(x(·), y(·)) (5.3)
Here symbolsX(x0, y0, U), X(x0, y0, V ) denote trajectories of dynamical system (5.1) gen-
erated by feedback controls U = u(t, x, y, ε) and V = v(t, x, y, ε).
5.2 Properties of Value Functions
Let us indicate some properties of value function w1 : [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ R.
Property 5.1 Let w1(t, x, y) be the value function for the differential game with dynamics
(5.1) and payoff functional
J1(t, x(·), y(·)) =
∫ +∞
t
exp(−λs)g1(x(s), y(s))ds (5.4)
x(t) = x, y(t) = y
Then value functions w1(x, y) and w1(t, x, y) are connected by relation
w1(t, x, y) = exp(−λt)w1(x, y) (5.5)
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Property 5.2 Let w1(t, T, x, y) be the value function for the differential game with dy-
namics (5.1) and payoff functional
J1(t, T, x(·), y(·)) =
∫ T
t
exp(−λs)g1(x(s), y(s))ds (5.6)
x(t) = x, y(t) = y
Then value functions w1(t, x, y) and w1(t, T, x, y) are connected by inequality
max
(t,x,y)∈[0,T ]×[0,1]×[0,1]
|w1(t, x, y)− w1(t, T, x, y)| ≤ K
λ
exp(−λT ) (5.7)
Here parameter K depends only on coefficients aij of matrix A = {aij}.
Property 5.3 Value function w1 is bounded
max
(x,y)∈[0,1]×[0,1]
|w1(x, y)| ≤ K
λ
(5.8)
Property 5.4 Value function w1 satisfies the Lipschitz condition
|w1(x1, y1)− w1(x2, y2)| ≤ K
1 + λ
(|x1 − x2|+ |y1 − y2|) ≤
√
2K
1 + λ
((x1 − x2)2 + (y1 − y2)2) 12 (5.9)
Proof. Let us choose arbitrarily ε > 0. Determine a moment of time T, 0 ≤ T < +∞
from the relation
exp(−λT )K < ε
i.e.
T >
1
λ
ln
K
ε
Consider value function w1(0, T, x, y). According to Property 5.2 we have
|w1(x, y)− w1(0, T, x, y)| ≤ K
λ
exp(−λT ) ≤ Kε
λ
Let U0 and V 0 be feedback controls realizing external extremum in relations which deter-
mine value function w1(0, T, x, y), i.e.
w1(0, T, x, y) =
max
U
min
(x(·),y(·))∈X(x,y,U)
J1(0, T, x(·), y(·)) =
min
(x(·),y(·))∈X(x,y,U0)
J1(0, T, x(·), y(·)) =
min
V
max
(x(·),y(·))∈X(x,y,V )
J1(0, T, x(·), y(·)) =
max
(x(·),y(·))∈X(x,y,V 0)
J1(0, T, x(·), y(·))
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Consider the diﬀerence
w1(0, T, x1, y1)− w1(0, T, x2, y2) =
min
(x(·),y(·))∈X(x,y,U0)
J1(0, T, x(·), y(·))− max
(x(·),y(·))∈X(x,y,V0)
J1(0, T, x(·), y(·)) =
J1(0, T, x0(·), y0(·))− J1(0, T, x0(·), y0(·)) ≤
J1(0, T, x1(·), y1(·))− J1(0, T, x2(·), y2(·)) + ε
Here (x1(·), y1(·)) and (x2(·), y2(·)) are ”Euler splines” which are close enough to trajec-
tories (x0(·), y0(·)) and (x0(·), y0(·)) realizing corresponding extremum.
According to the stability property of dynamical system (see Corollary 3.1) we have
the following estimate
J1(0, T, x1(·), y1(·))− J1(0, T, x2(·), y2(·)) ≤
K
1 + λ
(|x1 − x2|+ |y1 − y2|)
Let us note that the last estimate does not depend on T .
Combining all estimates together we obtain one-sided inequality for the Lipschitz
condition (5.9). Changing places of equal ”maxmin” and ”minmax” in the previous
arguments we come to the complementary estimate of the Lipschitz condition. Thus,
condition (5.9) is proven.
Remark 5.1 Properties 5.1 - 5.4 are valid also for the value function w2
w2(x0, y0) = sup
V
inf
(x(·),y(·))∈X(x0,y0,V )
J2(x(·), y(·)) =
inf
U
sup
(x(·),y(·))∈X(x0,y0,U)
J2(x(·), y(·)) (5.10)
of the second auxiliary differential game.
6 Value Functions and Minimax (Viscosity) Solu-
tions of Hamilton-Jacobi Equations
6.1 Hamilton-Jacobi Equations
The most principal properties of value functions are so-called properties of stability (u
and v stability [Krasovskii, Subbotin, 1988]) which express the principle of optimality
(suboptimality, superoptimality) of dynamical programming. At points where value func-
tion w1(x, y) is diﬀerentiable these properties convert to the ﬁrst order partial diﬀerential
equation of Hamilton-Jacobi type which is called Bellman-Isaacs equation or the basic
equation for optimal control problems. For our optimal guaranteed control problem (dif-
ferential game) (5.1),(5.2) the corresponding Bellman-Isaacs equation has the following
form
−λw(x, y)− ∂w
∂x
x− ∂w
∂y
y +
max
0≤u≤1
∂w
∂x
u+ min
0≤v≤1
∂w
∂y
v = 0 (6.1)
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Remark 6.1 Equation (6.1) does not depend on time t. It is an equation of stationary
type.
It is easy to see that
max
0≤u≤1
∂w
∂x
u = max
{
0,
∂w
∂x
}
min
0≤v≤1
∂w
∂y
v = min
{
0,
∂w
∂y
}
(6.2)
Therefore, equation (6.1) can be rewritten in the form
−λw(x, y)− ∂w
∂x
x− ∂w
∂y
y +
max
{
0,
∂w
∂x
}
+min
{
0,
∂w
∂y
}
= 0 (6.3)
6.2 Generalized Derivatives, Differential Inequalities
Usually value function w1(x, y) is not diﬀerentiable everywhere. It satisﬁes only the
Lipschitz condition (5.9), i.e. it is only almost everywhere diﬀerentiable according to
Rademaher theorem.
It is shown in the theory of minimax (viscosity) solutions [Subbotin, 1980, 1991],
[Crandall, Lions, 1983, 1984] that value function w1 must satisfy generalized diﬀerential
inequalities at points where it is not diﬀerentiable (measure of this set is equal to zero).
These inequalities generalize Bellman-Isaacs equation and express the optimality principle
of dynamical programming in inﬁnitesimal form.
In order to write the principle of dynamical programming in inﬁntesimal form let us
introduce the notions of directional derivatives and conjugate derivatives for functions
which satisfy the Lipschitz condition.
Let function w(x, y) : [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ R satisfy the Lipschitz condition.
Definition 6.1 Lower and upper derivatives of function w at a point (x, y) ∈ (0, 1)×(0, 1)
in a direction h = (h1, h2) ∈ R2 are determined by relations
∂−w(x, y)|(h) = lim inf
δ↓0
w(x+ δh1, y + δh2) −w(x, y)
δ
∂+w(x, y)|(h) = lim sup
δ↓0
w(x+ δh1, y + δh2) −w(x, y)
δ
(6.4)
Definition 6.2 Lower and upper conjugate derivatives of function w at a point (x, y) ∈
(0, 1) × (0, 1) are determined by equalities
D∗w(x, y)|(s) = sup
h∈R2
(〈s, h〉 − ∂−w(x, y)|(h))
D∗w(x, y)|(s) = inf
h∈R2
(〈s, h〉 − ∂+w(x, y)|(h)) (6.5)
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It is proven (see, for example, [Subbotin, 1980, 1991], [Crandall, Lions, 1983, 1984],
[Subbotin, Tarasyev, 1985], [Dolcetta, 1983], [Adiatulina, Tarasyev, 1987]) in the theory
of minimax (viscosity) solution that value function w1(x, y) is uniquely determined by the
pair of diﬀerential inequalities which connect conjugate derivatives with the Hamiltonian
of dynamical system. Let us give this result for diﬀerential game (5.1),(5.2).
Theorem 6.1 For a Lipschitz continuous function w : [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ R to be the value
function of differential game (5.1),(5.2) it is necessary and sufficient that the following
differential inequalities hold for all (x, y, s) ∈ (0, 1) × (0, 1)×R2
D∗w(x, y)|(s) ≥ −λw(x, y) +H(x, y, s) (6.6)
D∗w(x, y)|(s) ≤ −λw(x, y) +H(x, y, s) (6.7)
Here the symbol H(x, y, s) denotes the Hamiltonian of dynamical system (5.1)
H(x, y, s) = −s1x− s2y +max{0, s1}+min{0, s2}+ g1(x, y) (6.8)
s = (s1, s2) ∈ R2
g1(x, y) = CAxy − α1x− α2y + a22
Remark 6.2 Inequalities (6.6),(6.7) turn into Bellman-Isaacs equation (6.3) at points
where function w is differentiable.
Remark 6.3 Differential inequality (6.7) expresses the so-called property of u-stability of
the value function w which implies the existence of directions of nondecrease. Similarly,
differential inequality (6.6) expresses property of v-stability which means that there exist
directions of nonincrease for the value function w. Thus, relations (6.6),(6.7) can be
interpreted as infinitesimal form of the dynamical programming principle.
6.3 Piecewise Smooth Value Function
The prevalent situation is the piecewise smooth construction for the value function w. In
this case smooth components of the value function must satisfy Bellman-Isaacs (Hamilton-
Jacobi) equation (6.3) and on surfaces of continuous contraction of these smooth com-
ponents diﬀerential inequalities (6.6),(6.7) must hold. Realization of diﬀerential inequal-
ities (6.6),(6.7) on surfaces of contraction is essential. There exist numerous examples
demonstrating that there exist piecewise smooth functions which satisfy Hamilton-Jacobi
equation at points of their diﬀerentiability but these functions are not the value function
because they don’t satisfy relations (6.6),(6.7).
For piecewise smooth functions directional derivatives and conjugate derivatives can
be calculated in the framework of nonsmooth and convex analysis. Let us give corre-
sponding formulas. Assume that for function w the following equalities are valid in some
neighborhood Oε(x∗, y∗) of point (x∗, y∗) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1)
w(x, y) = min
i∈I
max
j∈J
ϕij(x, y) = max
j∈J
min
i∈I
ϕij(x, y) (6.9)
w(x∗, y∗) = ϕij(x∗, y∗), i ∈ I, j ∈ J
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Then directional derivatives are determined by relations
∂−w(x∗, y∗)|(h) = ∂+w(x∗, y∗)|(h) = ∂w(x∗, y∗)|(h) =
min
i∈I
max
j∈J
〈bij , h〉 = max
j∈J
min
i∈I
〈bij, h〉 (6.10)
bij =
(
∂ϕij
∂x
,
∂ϕij
∂y
)
, h = (h1, h2)
Let us introduce the following notations
C =
⋂
i∈I
Bi, Bi = co{bij : j ∈ J}
D =
⋂
j∈J
Bj , Bj = co{bij : i ∈ I}
Then conjugate derivatives are determined by relations
D∗w(x∗, y∗)|(s) =
{
0 if s ∈ C
+∞ otherwise (6.11)
D∗w(x∗, y∗)|(s) =
{
0 if s ∈ D
−∞ otherwise (6.12)
Remark 6.4 The sets C and D may be empty. In this case the corresponding conju-
gate derivatives have infinite values and differential inequalities (6.6),(6.7) are obviously
fulfilled.
6.4 Example
Let us consider an example in which the value function is diﬀerentiable and can be found
by the method of indetermined coeﬃcients.
We rewrite Hamilton-Jacobi equation in the following way
−λw(x, y) + (CAxy − α1x− α2y + a22)−
∂w
∂x
x− ∂w
∂y
y +max
{
0,
∂w
∂x
}
+min
{
0,
∂w
∂y
}
= 0 (6.13)
Without loss of generality we will assume that CA > 0. Let us ﬁnd solution w in the form
w(x, y) = Dxy − γ1x− γ2y + d (6.14)
Here D, γ1, γ2, d are indetermined coeﬃcients. In additition we will suppose that partial
derivatives conserve their signs
∂w
∂x
= Dy − γ1 ≤ 0 (6.15)
∂w
∂y
= Dx − γ2 ≥ 0 (6.16)
and, hence, the following relations hold
max
{
0,
∂w
∂x
}
= 0
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min
{
0,
∂w
∂y
}
= 0
We substitute function w (6.14) to (6.13) and obtain the equation
−λ(Dxy − γ1x− γ2y + d) + (CAxy − α1x− α2y + a22)−
(Dy − γ1)x− (Dx− γ2)y = 0
Setting equal coeﬃcients at similar terms we come to equations with respect to indeter-
mined coeﬃcients D, γ1, γ2, d. Solving these equations we obtain the following solution
D =
CA
2 + λ
γ1 =
α1
1 + λ
γ2 =
α2
1 + λ
d =
a22
λ
(6.17)
CoeﬃcientsD, γ1, γ2 must satisfy conditions (6.15),(6.16). Substituting (6.17) to (6.15),(6.16)
we ﬁnd conditions for the initial matrix A which ensure that the value function w is dif-
ferentiable and has the form (6.14),(6.17). We have from (6.15),(6.17)
y ≤ α1(2 + λ)
CA(1 + λ)
, y ∈ [0, 1]
The last inequality holds if and only if coeﬃcients of matrix A satisfy condition
α1
CA
≥ 1 + λ
2 + λ
(6.18)
From (6.16),(6.17) we obtain
x ≥ α2(2 + λ)
CA(1 + λ)
, x ∈ [0, 1]
The last inequality is equivalent to the following condition for coeﬃcients of matrix A
α2 ≥ 0 (6.19)
Thus, if relations (6.18),(6.19) hold then function w (6.14),(6.17) is the diﬀerentiable
solution of Hamilton-Jacobi equation (6.13).
Remark 6.5 As a pattern of matrix which satisfy conditions (6.18),(6.19) one can take,
for example, the matrix
A =
(
3 0
2 2
)
(6.20)
Parameter λ is constrained here by the inequality
0 < λ ≤ 1
Let us note that matrix A (6.20) does not have a dominating line but has the dominating
first column.
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Remark 6.6 One can find analogously the differentiable solution of Hamilton-Jacobi
equation (6.13) for other combinations of inequalities of the type (6.15),(6.16).
Remark 6.7 In the general case inequalities of the type (6.15),(6.16) are not valid for all
(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1]. In such situations value functions are not everywhere differentiable.
The structure of the value function is rather complex in this case and it does not have
analytical description. Therefore, below we propose the numerical method for construction
of value functions.
7 Approximation Operators and Method of Con-
traction Mappings for Construction of General-
ized Solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi Equations
7.1 Discrete Approximation of Hamilton-Jacobi Equations
Let us consider the discrete approximation of Hamilton-Jacobi equation (6.1). We ﬁx
parameter h ∈ (0, 1
λ
). Note that parameter h can be interpreted as quantization step of
time intervals.
Definition 7.1 Algebraic equation of the type
−w1,h(x, y) + hg1(x, y) +
(1− λh) max
0≤u≤1
min
0≤v≤1
w1,h(x+ h(−x+ u), y + h(−y + v)) = 0 (7.1)
(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1]
g1(x, y) = CAxy − α1x− α2y + a22
is called discrete approximation of Hamilton-Jacobi equation (6.1).
Remark 7.1 The solution w1,h(x, y) of equation (7.1) is an approximation for general-
ized solution w1(x, y) of Hamilton-Jacobi equation (6.1). It is known (see, for example,
[Dolcetta, 1983], [Adiatulina, Tarasyev, 1987]) that when h ↓ 0 functions w1,h(x, y) tend
to function w1(x, y) in the space of Lipschitz continuous functions and order of approxi-
mation estimate is h
1
2
max
(x,y)∈[0,1]×[0,1]
|w1,h(x, y)− w1(x, y)| ≤ Eh
1
2 (7.2)
Remark 7.2 Parallel with equation (7.1) one can consider the discrete approximation of
Hamilton-Jacobi equation (6.1) in which the sequence of operations ”maxmin” is replaced
by the sequence ”minmax”
−w1,h(x, y) + hg1(x, y) +
(1− λh) min
0≤v≤1
max
0≤u≤1
w1,h(x+ h(−x+ u), y + h(−y + v)) = 0 (7.3)
The solution w1,h(x, y) of equation (7.3) also converges to generalized solution w1(x, y)
with the estimate
max
(x,y)∈[0,1]×[0,1]
|w1,h(x, y)− w1(x, y)| ≤ Eh 12 (7.4)
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7.2 Method of Successive Approximations
Let us pass now to the question of ﬁnding solutions w1,h(x, y), w1,h(x, y) of equations
(7.1),(7.3). One can prove (see, for example, [Dolcetta, 1983], [Adiatulina, Tarasyev,
1987]) that equations (7.1),(7.3) contain contraction operators and, therefore, can be
solved by the method of successive approximations. Let us indicate these contraction
operators Π∗ and Π∗
Π∗w(x, y) = hg1(x, y) +
(1− λh) max
0≤u≤1
min
0≤v≤1
w(x+ h(−x+ u), y + h(−y + v)) (7.5)
Π∗w(x, y) = hg1(x, y) +
(1− λh) min
0≤v≤1
max
0≤u≤1
w(x+ h(−x+ u), y + h(−y + v)) (7.6)
Contraction coeﬃcients of operators Π∗ and Π∗ are equal to (1− λh). According to the
principle of contraction mappings we can formulate the following statement.
Theorem 7.1 Equations (7.1),(7.3)
w1,h(x, y) = Π∗w1,h(x, y)
w1,h(x, y) = Π
∗w1,h(x, y)
have unique solutions in the class of bounded, Lipschitz continuous functions. Moreover,
iterative procedures
wn1,h(x, y) = Π∗w
n−1
1,h (x, y) = hg1(x, y) +
(1− λh) max
0≤u≤1
min
0≤v≤1
wn−11,h (x+ h(−x+ u), y + h(−y + v)) (7.7)
wn1,h(x, y) = Π
∗wn−11,h (x, y) = hg1(x, y) +
(1− λh) min
0≤v≤1
max
0≤u≤1
wn−11,h (x+ h(−x+ u), y + h(−y + v)) (7.8)
converge uniformly to solutions of equations (7.1),(7.3) for any initial approximations
w01,h(x, y), w
0
1,h(x, y) which are bounded and Lipschitz continuous.
As patterns for initial approximations w01,h(x, y), w
0
1,h(x, y) one can take function g1(x, y)
or zero function.
Remark 7.3 According to the principle of contraction mappings the following estimates
are also valid
max
(x,y)∈[0,1]×[0,1]
|w1,h(x, y)− wn1,h(x, y)| ≤
K
λ
(1− λh)n (7.9)
max
(x,y)∈[0,1]×[0,1]
|w1,h(x, y)− wn1,h(x, y)| ≤
K
λ
(1− λh)n (7.10)
n = 0, 1, 2, ...
Taking into account estimates (7.2),(7.4),(7.9),(7.10) for functions w1, w1,h, w1,h, w
n
1,h,
wn1,h, n = 0, 1, 2, ... one can obtain estimates of convergence of functions w
n
1,h, w
n
1,h, to the
function w1. More precisely, the following statement takes place.
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Theorem 7.2 Estimates (7.11),(7.12) are valid
max
(x,y)∈[0,1]×[0,1]
|w1(x, y)− wm1,h(x, y)| ≤ Gh
1
2 (7.11)
max
(x,y)∈[0,1]×[0,1]
|w1(x, y)− wm1,h(x, y)| ≤ Gh
1
2 (7.12)
Here h ∈ (0,min
{
1
λ
, 1
}
), G is a constant which does not depend on h, a number m depends
on h and is determined by condition
(1− λh)m ≤ h 12 (7.13)
7.3 Discrete Approximations for the Second Differential Game
Analogous results are valid for the diﬀerential game with the second payoﬀ functional
J2. Namely, let us consider discrete approximations of Hamilton-Jacobi equation for the
value function w2(x, y)
−w2,h(x, y) + hg2(x, y) +
(1− λh) max
0≤v≤1
min
0≤u≤1
w2,h(x+ h(−x+ u), y + h(−y + v)) = 0 (7.14)
−w2,h(x, y) + hg2(x, y) +
(1− λh) min
0≤u≤1
max
0≤v≤1
w2,h(x+ h(−x+ u), y + h(−y + v)) = 0 (7.15)
(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1]
g2(x, y) = CBxy − β1x− β2y + b22
Equations (7.14),(7.15) contain contraction operators Φ∗ and Φ∗ with contraction coeﬃ-
cients equal to (1− λh)
Φ∗w(x, y) = hg2(x, y) +
(1− λh) max
0≤v≤1
min
0≤u≤1
w(x+ h(−x+ u), y + h(−y + v))
Φ∗w(x, y) = hg2(x, y) +
(1− λh) min
0≤u≤1
max
0≤v≤1
w(x+ h(−x+ u), y + h(−y + v))
Equations (7.14),(7.15) can be rewritten in the form
w2,h(x, y) = Φ∗w2,h(x, y)
w2,h(x, y) = Φ
∗w2,h(x, y)
The method of successive approximations for these equations provides convergence to the
unique solution. Namely, the following iterative procedures converge
wn2,h(x, y) = Φ∗w
n−1
2,h (x, y) = hg2(x, y) +
(1− λh) max
0≤v≤1
min
0≤u≤1
wn−12,h (x+ h(−x+ u), y + h(−y + v)) (7.16)
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wn2,h(x, y) = Φ
∗wn−12,h (x, y) = hg2(x, y) +
(1− λh) min
0≤u≤1
max
0≤v≤1
wn−12,h (x+ h(−x+ u), y + h(−y + v)) (7.17)
Moreover, approximations wn2,h and w
n
2,h converge also to the value function w2 when
n→∞, h ↓ 0 and the following estimates of convergence take place
max
(x,y)∈[0,1]×[0,1]
|w2(x, y)− wm2,h(x, y)| ≤ Gh
1
2 (7.18)
max
(x,y)∈[0,1]×[0,1]
|w2(x, y)− wm2,h(x, y)| ≤ Gh
1
2 (7.19)
for number m satisfying condition (7.13).
Thus, we need to construct two approximations wm1,h, w
m
1,h for the value function w1
and two approximations wm2,h, w
m
2,h for the value function w2.
7.4 Optimal Feedback Controls
Very important detail of the considered construction consists in the fact that functions
wm1,h, w
m
1,h, w
m
2,h, w
m
2,h keep information not only about approximation values of generalized
solutions w1 and w2 but simultaneously they allow to determine approximations of opti-
mal feedback controls: ”positive feedback controls” u01,h(x, y), v
0
2,h(x, y) and ”punishment
feedback controls” u02,h(x, y), v
0
1,h(x, y). Namely, ”positive feedback controls” u
0
1,h(x, y),
v02,h(x, y) can be determined as arguments u, v which realize external maximum in formulas
(7.7),(7.16) when n = m
u01,h(x, y) = arg max0≤u≤1
min
0≤v≤1
wm−11,h (x+ h(−x+ u), y + h(−y + v)) (7.20)
v02,h(x, y) = arg max
0≤v≤1
min
0≤u≤1
wm−12,h (x+ h(−x+ u), y + h(−y + v)) (7.21)
”Punishment feedback controls” u02,h(x, y), v
0
1,h(x, y) are determined analogously as argu-
ments u, v which realize external minimum in formulas (7.17),(7.8) when n = m
u02,h(x, y) = arg min
0≤u≤1
max
0≤v≤1
wm−12,h (x+ h(−x+ u), y + h(−y + v)) (7.22)
v01,h(x, y) = arg min
0≤v≤1
max
0≤u≤1
wm−11,h (x+ h(−x+ u), y + h(−y + v)) (7.23)
Let us remind that quadruple u0i,h(x, y), v
0
j,h(x, y) i, j = 1, 2 forms one of Nash equilib-
ria. Namely, ”positive feedback controls” u01,h(x, y), v
0
2,h(x, y) generate the trajectory ”ac-
ceptable” for both populations. And ”punishment feedback controls” u02,h(x, y), v
0
1,h(x, y)
are the instrument which forces populations to follow this trajectory.
7.5 Conjecture on the Structure of Optimal Synthesis
Taking into account that payoﬀ functions g1(x, y), g2(x, y) are bilinear, their gradients
∂gk/∂x, ∂gk/∂y, k = 1, 2 are linear and control parameters u, v are linearly presented
in the dynamical system we can propose the following conjecture about the structure of
optimal feedback controls u0i,h(x, y), v
0
j,h(x, y) i, j = 1, 2.
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Proposition 7.1 (Conjecture on the structure of optimal synthesis).
There is a curve in the square [0, 1] × [0, 1] of phase states which passes through the
point (α2/CA, α1/CA) and divides the square into two parts. In one part the optimal
feedback control is equal to zero and in another part - to unit.
Moreover, in some neighborhood of such curve for ”positive” control synthesis u01,h(x, y),
v02,h(x, y) corresponding approximation functions w
m
1,h, w
m
2,h are concave and for ”punish-
ment” control synthesis u02,h(x, y), v
0
1,h(x, y) corresponding approximation functions w
m
2,h,
wm1,h are convex.
For the optimal control u01,h(x, y), for example, such curve must be disposed in the
domain G
G = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : g1(x, y) ≥ VA}
and passes through the point (α2/CA, α1/CA). Here VA = (a4CA − α1α2)/CA is the value
of the corresponding matrix game.
8 Numerical Realization of Iterative Procedure for
Construction of Value Functions and Synthesis of
Controls
8.1 Grid Schemes for Construction of Value Functions
For numerical realization of iterative procedures (7.7),(7.8) and (7.16),(7.17) we use grid
approximation for corresponding iterative functions which leads in fact to the grid scheme
for solving Hamilton-Jacobi equation. Formally it is necessary to calculate formulas
(7.7),(7.8) and (7.16),(7.17) at all points (x, y) of the square of phase states. In order
to make this procedure ﬁnite we will fulﬁll these calculations only at nodes of the ﬁxed
grid given on the square. Let us assume that values of iterative functions wn1,h, w
n
1,h, w
n
2,h,
wn2,h determined at nodes of the grid are interpolated linearly to the whole square for the
given triangulation Ω.
Let us give the description of the proposed numerical procedure. Let the following
quantization steps be given:
h be a quantization step of the time interval
∆x be a quantization step of the square by variable x
∆y be a quantization step of the square by variable y
∆p be a quantization step of the segment [0, 1]
of constraints for control parameter u
∆q be a quantization step of the segment [0, 1]
of constraints for control parameter v
We shall assume that there is linear relation between steps h, ∆x, ∆y, ∆p, ∆q, i.e.
the following relations hold
∆x = Kxh, ∆y = Kyh
∆p = Kph, ∆q = Kqh
(8.1)
Next, let us suppose that values of iterative functions wn−1 = wn−1i,h or w
n−1 = wn−1i,h ,
i = 1, 2 have been calculated already at nodes of the grid GR
GR = {(xi, yj) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : xi = i∆x, yj = j∆y} (8.2)
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which is given on the square of phase states and determined by quantization steps ∆x,
∆y.
Assume for deﬁniteness that functions wn−1 are interpolated in the square of phase
states according to the following triangulation. Consider triangulation Ω of the square
[0, 1]× [0, 1] by simplexes of types S+ and S−
S+ = co{(xi, yj), (xi +∆x, yj), (xi, yj +∆y)} (8.3)
S− = co{(xi, yj), (xi −∆x, yj), (xi, yj −∆y)} (8.4)
It is clear that for any point (x, y) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1] there exists simplex T of type S+ or
S− such that (x, y) ∈ T . It can be determined by the following relations. Let (x, y) ∈
[0, 1]× [0, 1] and
i = int(
x
∆x
), j = int(
y
∆y
)
xi = i∆x, yj = j∆y
Two cases can appear.
Case 1. If
(x− xi)∆y + (y − yj)∆x ≤ ∆x∆y
then
(x, y) ∈ co{(xi, yj), (xi +∆x, yj), (xi, yj +∆y)} = T1
(x, y) = λ1(xi, yj) + λ2(xi +∆x, yj) + λ3(xi, yj +∆y)
λ2 =
x− xi
∆x
≥ 0
λ3 =
y − yj
∆y
≥ 0
λ1 = 1− λ2 − λ3 ≥ 0
Here simplex T1 is of the type S+. The value of function wn−1 at point (x, y) is interpolated
linearly
wn−1(x, y) = λ1w
n−1(xi, yj) +
λ2w
n−1(xi +∆x, yj) + λ3w
n−1(xi, yj +∆y) (8.5)
Case 2. If
(x− xi)∆y + (y − yj)∆x > ∆x∆y
then
(x, y) ∈ co{(xi +∆x, yj +∆y), (xi+∆x, yj), (xi, yj +∆y)} = T2
(x, y) = λ1(xi +∆x, yj +∆y) + λ2(xi +∆x, yj) + λ3(xi, yj +∆y)
λ3 =
(xi +∆x)− x
∆x
≥ 0
λ2 =
(yj +∆y)− y
∆y
≥ 0
λ1 = 1− λ2 − λ3 ≥ 0
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Here simplex T2 is of the type S−. The value of function wn−1 at point (x, y) is interpolated
linearly
wn−1(x, y) = λ1w
n−1(xi +∆x, yj +∆y) +
λ2w
n−1(xi +∆x, yj) + λ3w
n−1(xi, yj +∆y) (8.6)
Let us give now formulas for calculating the following iterations wn based on values
of previous iterations wn−1 at nodes of the grid GR. Let xi = i∆x, yj = j∆y. For values
of functions wn1,h, w
n
1,h, w
n
2,h, w
n
2,h at nodes xi, yj we have the following relations
wn1,h(xi, yj) = hg1(xi, yj) + (1− λh)max
k
min
l
wn−11,h (xk, yl) (8.7)
wn1,h(xi, yj) = hg1(xi, yj) + (1− λh)min
l
max
k
wn−11,h (xk, yl) (8.8)
wn2,h(xi, yj) = hg2(xi, yj) + (1− λh)max
l
min
k
wn−12,h (xk, yl) (8.9)
wn2,h(xi, yj) = hg2(xi, yj) + (1− λh)min
k
max
l
wn−12,h (xk, yl) (8.10)
xk = xi + h(−xi + k∆p)
yl = yj + h(−yj + l∆q)
Without loss of generality of arguments we use here the same notations as we do before
for corresponding approximations. Let us note that values of functions wn−1 in formulas
(8.7)-(8.10) are calculated according to (8.5),(8.6). In addition, operations max and min
in (8.7)-(8.10) are determined on ﬁnite sets of indexes k, l and, therefore, can be easily
calculated.
As to convergence of numerical procedures (8.7)-(8.10) then we can prove here the fol-
lowing statement using results of papers [Souganidis, 1985], [Subbotin, Tarasyev, Ushakov,
1993], [Tarasyev, 1994], [Bardi, Osher, 1991].
Theorem 8.1 Approximation grid schemes (8.7)-(8.10) converge to corresponding solu-
tions w1, w2 of Hamilton-Jacobi equations (value functions of correspondig differential
games) when n→∞, h ↓ 0. The estimate of convergence has the order h 12 .
8.2 Grid Approximation of Control Synthesis
Let us remind that together with values of functions wn1,h, w
n
1,h, w
n
2,h, w
n
2,h we calculate also
approximations un1(xi, yj), v
n
2 (xi, yj) of ”positive” feedback controls u
0
1(xi, yj), v
0
2(xi, yj)
and aproximations un2(xi, yj), v
n
1 (xi, yj) of ”punishment” feedback controls u
0
2(xi, yj) ,
v01(xi, yj) at nodes (xi, yj) of the grid GR. Namely, approximations u
n
1 (xi, yj), v
n
2 (xi, yj)
are determined as arguments which realize external maximum in (8.7),(8.9)
un1(xi, yj) = k
∗∆p
k∗ = k∗(n) = argmax
k
min
l
wn−11,h (xk, yl) (8.11)
vn2 (xi, yj) = l
∗∆q
l∗ = l∗(n) = argmax
l
min
k
wn−12,h (xk, yl) (8.12)
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Similarly, approximations un2(xi, yj), v
n
1 (xi, yj) are determined as arguments which realize
external minimum in (8.10),(8.8)
un2(xi, yj) = k∗∆p
k∗ = k∗(n) = argmin
k
max
l
wn−12,h (xk, yl) (8.13)
vn1 (xi, yj) = l∗∆q
l∗ = l∗(n) = argmin
l
max
k
wn−11,h (xk, yl) (8.14)
xk = xi + h(−xi +∆pk)
yl = yj + h(−yj +∆ql)
Let us note that feedback controls (8.11)-(8.14) are determined only at nodes (xi, yj) of
the grid GR. If we accept the conjecture on structure of optimal synthesis (see Proposition
(7.1)) then we can interpolate linearly values of controls (8.11)-(8.14) to the whole square
[0, 1]× [0, 1] of phase states. More precisely, the following proposition is valid.
Proposition 8.1 Linear interpolations un1(x, y), u
n
2 (x, y), v
n
1 (x, y), v
n
2 (x, y) of values
un1 (xi, yj), u
n
2(xi, yj), v
n
1 (xi, yj), v
n
2 (xi, yj) according to triangulation Ω (8.3),(8.4) of the
square [0, 1]× [0, 1] can guarantee result on generated trajectories (x(t), y(t)), t ∈ [0,+∞)
which is arbitrarily close to the value w1(x(0), y(0)) or w2(x(0), y(0)) of corresponding
differential games.
Remark 8.1 If conjecture on structure of optimal synthesis postulated in Proposition
(7.1) does not fulfill then we need high order quantization of phase variables in comparison
with time step h
∆x = Kxh
2, ∆y = Kyh
2
In this case piecewise constant interpolations un1(x, y), u
n
2(x, y), v
n
1 (x, y), v
n
2 (x, y) of values
un1 (xi, yj), u
n
2(xi, yj), v
n
1 (xi, yj), v
n
2 (xi, yj) ensure result on generated trajectories
(x(t), y(t)), t ∈ [0,+∞) which is arbitrarily close to the value w1(x(0), y(0)) or
w2(x(0), y(0)) of corresponding differential games.
9 Alliance of ”Long-Term” and ”Short-Term” In-
terests of Populations and Individuals
9.1 ”Short-Term” Interests of Individuals and Constraints on
Control Parameters in the Game Problem for ”Long-Term”
Interests of Populations
Let us remind that in the considered nonantagonistic (nonzero sum) game of two popu-
lations with dynamics (5.1) and payoﬀ functionals J1 (2.7) for the ﬁrst population and
J2 (2.8) for the second population control parameters u, v are constrained by the segment
[0, 1]. As it was mentioned above, extreme values of these parameters can be interpreted
as control signals for populations: ”to change” one behavioral action for another. In the
general case these signals can contradict to ”short-term” interests of individuals. Contra-
diction for the ﬁrst population is interpreted here in the sense that the following relations
take place simultaneously
u01(x, y) = 0 (9.1)
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and
u∗1(x, y) = arg max
0≤u≤1
∂g1
∂x
u = 1 (9.2)
or vice versa
u01(x, y) = 1 (9.3)
and
u∗1(x, y) = arg max0≤u≤1
∂g1
∂x
u = 0 (9.4)
Relations (9.1),(9.3) correspond to ”long-term” interests of the ﬁrst population and rela-
tions (9.2),(9.4) correspond to ”short-term” interests of individuals. In other words the
payoﬀ function g1 and the value function w1 can have ”gradients” (subgradients) of dif-
ferent signs at a point (x, y). ”Gradient” for the value function is understood here in the
generalized sense.
Contradiction for the second population is understood analogously.
The indicated contradiction between ”long-term” interests determined by the value
function and ”short-term” interests determined by the payoﬀ function can be overcome in
the statement of the problem if we insert information about ”short-term” interests of indi-
viduals into constraints on control parameters u, v. Of course, these new constraints have
peculiarity: they depend on a phase state (x, y) of dynamical system (5.1). More precisely,
contradictions between ”long-term” and ”short-term” interests of the ﬁrst population is
eliminated if control parameter u satisﬁes the following constraints
x ≤ φ1(x, y) ≤ u ≤ φ2(x, y) ≤ 1 if ∂g1
∂x
= CAy − α1 ≥ 0
0 ≤ φ3(x, y) ≤ u ≤ φ4(x, y) ≤ x if ∂g1
∂x
= CAy − α1 < 0 (9.5)
Restrictions on control parameter v can be written analogously
y ≤ ψ1(x, y) ≤ v ≤ ψ2(x, y) ≤ 1 if ∂g2
∂y
= CBx− β2 ≥ 0
0 ≤ ψ3(x, y) ≤ v ≤ ψ4(x, y) ≤ 1 if ∂g2
∂y
= CBx− β2 < 0 (9.6)
For example, one can take the following functions φi, ψi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4
φ1 = φ4 = x, φ2 = 1, φ3 = 0 (9.7)
ψ1 = ψ4 = y, ψ2 = 1, ψ3 = 0 (9.8)
9.2 Replicator Dynamics and Constraints on Control Param-
eters
The most interesting cases connected with classical models of evolutionary dynamics (see,
for example, [Hofbauer, Sigmund, 1988]) are constraints in which the so-called replicator
dynamics is presented
φ1 = φ4 = x+ x(x− 1)(CAy − α1) (9.9)
ψ1 = ψ4 = y + y(y − 1)(CBx− β2) (9.10)
For such constraints control parameters u, v switch dynamical system (5.1) from the op-
timal modes u01(x, y) = 0 or u
0
1(x, y) = 1 and v
0
2(x, y) = 0 or v
0
2(x, y) = 1 (which don’t
cotradict to the ”short-term” principle of optimality) to the replicator dynamics.
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Appendix. Results of Numerical Experiments.
The algorithms of numerical construction of value functions w1, w2 and feedback controls
u0i , v
0
j , i, j = 1, 2 described in Sections 7, 8 were realized in computer programs (PASCAL
programs) and corresponding illustrative results were produced by N.Mel’nikova. I would
like to thank her for this great work.
For numerical simulations two basic combinations of matrixes A and B generating
three or one static Nash equilibria in bimatrix games were considered. Let us remind that
three Nash equilibria appear in the case of “one-type” interests of populations which are
characterized by matrixes A and B. Broken lines (zigzags) of acceptable situations are
diﬀerently oriented (right and left zigzagz) and have three points of intersection - Nash
equilibria. The situation of one Nash equilibrium arises for “almost antagonistic” interests
of populations. Broken lines (zigzags) of acceptable situations generated by matrixes A
and B have the same orientation (both zigzags are right or left).
For the ﬁrst case with three Nash equilibria the following payoﬀ matrixes A and B of
“one-type” interests of populations were be taken
A = C1 =
(
11 2
3 6
)
CA = a11 − a12 − a21 + a22 = 12
α1 = a22 − a12 = 4
α2 = a22 − a21 = 3
B = C2 =
(
3 1
0 4
)
CB = b11 − b12 − b21 + b22 = 6
β1 = b22 − b12 = 3
β2 = b22 − b21 = 4
There exist the following saddle points SP1 = (1/4, 1/3) (for matrix A), SP2 =
(2/3, 1/2) (for matrix B) in corresponding matrix games. In the bimatrix game with
matrixesA = C1 and B = C2 there are three Nash equilibriaNE1 = (0, 0), NE2 = (1, 1),
NE3 = (2/3, 1/3).
As a result of numerical realization of algorithms described in Sections 7, 8 the follow-
ing value functions and feedback controls for the dynamical game with matrixes A = C1
and B = C2 were constructed. “Positive” feedback controls u01, v
0
2 have the form repre-
sented on Figures 1, 3. “Punishment” feedback controls u02, v
0
1 are depicted on Figures 2,
4. In the shaded domains of these Figures controls u and v are equal to unit and in the
unshaded domains they are equal to zero. On Figures 14, 15 graphs of the corresponding
value functions w1, w2 are given.
The “acceptable” trajectories (TR) (xε(·), yε(·)) generated by “positive” feedback con-
trols u01, v
0
2 from diﬀerent initial positions (IP) (x0, y0) are shown on Figures 7-10. These
trajectories consist of the pieces of characteristics corresponding to Hamilton-Jacobi equa-
tions. In this problem characteristics are straigt lines directed to diﬀerent corners of the
unit square. Switching from one characteristic to another takes place when trajectory
crosses switch lines (curves) SW1, SW2 generated by “positive” feedback controls u01, v
0
2.
For the considered initial positions (x0, y0) “acceptable” trajectories (xε(·), yε(·)) come to
the corner Nash equilibria NE1 or NE2.
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In the second case with one Nash equilibrium the following payoﬀ matrixes A and B
realizing “almost antagonistic” interests of populations were considered
A = C1 =
(
11 2
3 6
)
B = C3 =
(
2 4
5 1
)
CB = b11 − b12 − b21 + b22 = −6
β1 = b22 − b12 = −3
β2 = b22 − b21 = −4
The antagonistic (zero-sum) games have the same saddle points as in the previous case
SP1 = (1/4, 1/3), SP2 = (2/3, 1/2). But there is only one Nash equilibrium NE =
(2/3, 1/3) in the corresponding bimatrix game.
The following numerical results were obtained for the diﬀerential game of populations
with payoﬀ matrixes A = C1, B = C3. The structure of “positive” feedback controls u01,
v02 is represented on Figures 1, 5. “Punishment” feedback controls u
0
2, v
0
1 are given on
Figures 2, 6. Controls u, v are equal to unit in the shaded domains and they have zero
values otherwise. On Figures 14, 16 graphs of the value functions w1, w2 corresponding to
payoﬀ matrixes A = C1, B = C3 are depicted. The “acceptable” trajectories (xε(·), yε(·))
generated by “positive” feedback controls u01, v
0
2 from diﬀerent initial positions (IP) (x0, y0)
are shown on Figures 11-13. These trajectories as in the previous case are piecewise linear
and consist of pieces of characteristics directed to the corners of the square. Switching
from one characteristic to another happens at points of intersection of the “acceptable”
trajectory with switch lines SW1, SW2 of feedback controls u01, v
0
2 .
Let us note the very remarkable result which appears for “acceptable” trajectories in
the considered examples depicted on Figures 11-13. The “acceptable” trajectories don’t
converge to the static Nash equilibrium NE (or don’t circulate in a neighborhood of this
point NE) but tend to the point of intersection of switch lines SW1, SW2. Moreover, the
values of “long-term” payoﬀs J1, J2 calculated on the “acceptable” trajectory (xε(·), yε(·))
are better than the values of J1, J2 calculated on trajectories (x(·), y(·)) which start from
the same initial position (x0, y0) but converge to the static Nash equilibrium NE.
In conclusion let us consider the question on dependence of obtained solutions on
a discount coeﬃcient λ (remind that this coeﬃcient is one of basic parameters for the
examined problem). The last Figure (Figure 17) illustrates weak dependence of switch
lines on variation of the discount coeﬃcient λ. Namely, on Figure 17 we give switch lines
of “positive” feedback controls u01 for the payoﬀ matrix A = C1 calculated for discount
coeﬃcients: λ = DC1 = 1, λ = DC2 = 0.1. One can see that these curves diﬀer
very slightly from each other although the ratio of DC1 to DC2 is comparetively large
DC1/DC2 = 10.
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